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Abstract
In this paper we analyse the effectiveness of demand- and supply-side fiscal poli-
cies in the small open economy of Slovenia. Simulating the SLOPOL10 model, an 
econometric model of the Slovenian economy, we analyse the effectiveness of vari-
ous categories of public spending and taxes during the period 2020 to 2030, assum-
ing that no crisis occurs. Our simulations show that those public spending measures 
that entail both demand- and supply-side effects are more effective at stimulating 
real GDP and increasing employment than pure demand-side measures. This is 
due to the fact that supply-side measures also increase potential and not only actual 
GDP. Measures which foster research and development and those which improve the 
education level of the labour force are particularly effective in this respect. Employ-
ment can also be stimulated effectively by cutting the income tax rate and the social 
security contribution rate, i.e. by reducing the tax wedge on labour income, which 
positively affects Slovenia’s international competitiveness. Successful stabilisation 
policies should thus contain a supply-side component in addition to a demand-side 
component. We also provide a first simulation of potential effects of the Covid-19 
crisis on the Slovenian economy, which is modelled as a combined demand and sup-
ply shock.
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Until recently, the financial and economic crisis of 2007 to 2009, meanwhile known 
as the Great Recession, was the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s. In Slovenia, real GDP declined by as much as 7.8 percent in 2009. 
During the “Great Moderation” from the mid-1980s onwards (Lucas 2003), most 
economists and international organisations like the IMF or the OECD had more or 
less agreed that the optimal fiscal policy stance would be to refrain from discretion-
ary policies and to only let automatic stabilisers operate. During the Great Reces-
sion, monetary policy reacted quickly, by introducing expansionary measures, and 
fiscal policies followed suit, letting automatic stabilisers work and also introducing 
discretionary tax reductions or increases in public expenditure. In the Euro Area, the 
only macroeconomic stabilisation policy instrument available to Euro Area mem-
bers was fiscal policy. It is, therefore, of interest to investigate the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy in stabilising an economy like Slovenia’s. Such an analysis is even more 
interesting since in academia there is no consensus about the effectiveness of expan-
sionary fiscal policy measures. While some authors (e.g. Taylor 2009) argue against 
discretionary fiscal policy, others are more in favour of tax reductions or expendi-
ture increases and expect potentially large multiplier effects (e.g. Romer and Romer 
2010). In view of the architecture of the Euro Area and the fact that most of its 
members are small open economies, it is important and of general interest to clarify 
the appropriate role of fiscal policy for small open economies in a monetary union 
which are constrained by the problem of high public debt.
In this paper, we aim at contributing to this debate by empirically estimating fis-
cal policy effects for the Euro Area economy of Slovenia. We are particularly inter-
ested in the question as to whether demand-side (Keynesian) fiscal policies aiming 
primarily at supporting aggregate demand can contribute to stabilising this economy 
or whether policies primarily addressing the supply side are more successful. The 
debate between Keynesians and supply siders has been a hot topic since the sec-
ond half of the 1970s, and (like many macroeconomic policy debates) it has not 
yet been completely settled. The prevailing opinion (albeit not a consensus) con-
siders demand-side policies to be appropriate when combating an adverse demand-
side shock but not necessarily when faced with a supply-side shock. In the Great 
Recession, even the IMF, which had been very cautious towards demand-side poli-
cies before, argued in favour of supporting demand-side policies. Nevertheless, for 
the medium and longer term in particular, the European Commission proposed (and 
in some cases prescribed to member states) structural reforms to enhance potential 
growth. This implies that fiscal policy should also include supply-side measures. 
Such prescriptions are still issued regularly by the European Commission and other 
institutions today. In contrast, many politicians and interest group representatives 
heavily criticised what they called the “austerity regime” of the Commission and 
advocated an expansionary fiscal policy stance in spite of already high public debt.
Within academia, advocates of different macroeconomic theories still diverge 
in their judgment of the effectiveness of fiscal policies during a recession. In par-
ticular, the role of fiscal policy and the specific problems of countries within the 
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Euro Area are the subject of ongoing controversies (see, for instance, Coenen et al. 
2008; Cogan et al. 2010). It is well known that fiscal policy effects are smaller cet-
eris paribus in small and open economies than in larger and less open economies. 
Slovenia is an interesting case because it is the only small open transition economy 
which was already in the Euro Area before the Great Recession. Furthermore, an 
already high level of public debt is likely to undermine any positive effects of fiscal 
stimuli. Hence, a clear commitment to fiscal consolidation after overcoming a crisis 
is required (see, e.g., Spilimbergo et  al. 2009; IMF 2008). Fiscal multipliers may 
not only depend on the openness of an economy, but also on its position in the busi-
ness cycle. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) conclude that in particular spend-
ing multipliers tend to be larger in recessions than in expansions. Furthermore, strict 
fiscal consolidation measures in a recession might contribute to a deepening of the 
recession (Blanchard and Leigh 2013).
In this paper, we analyse the effects of different fiscal policy measures in Slove-
nia. We use the SLOPOL model, an econometric model of the Slovenian economy 
which we constructed, to simulate the effects of various tax and spending policies on 
important macroeconomic variables as well as on the public debt level. These simu-
lations extend earlier simulations reported in Blueschke et  al. (2019), Weyerstrass 
et al. (2020), and Neck et al. (2018) by focusing on some supply-side components of 
fiscal policies in addition to their demand-side effects.
Here we examine the question as to whether Slovenia would benefit more from a 
demand- or supply-side orientation of its fiscal policy with the help of an economet-
ric model. The plan of the paper is as follows: Sect. 2 describes the macroeconomet-
ric model SLOPOL10 which is used for the empirical analysis. Section 3 presents a 
forecast of the Slovenian macroeconomy for the years 2020 to 2030 obtained with 
the model and assuming no further exogenous shock in this period, which serves 
as the baseline solution for the policy simulation. In Sect. 4, we analyse fiscal poli-
cies in several model simulations. It turns out that expenditure-side budgetary meas-
ures with a strong supply-side content (especially research and development related 
spending and the enhancement of human capital) are most successful and effective 
at stabilising the Slovenian economy, while tax policies exert much smaller and tran-
sitory effects, except on unemployment. Section 5 presents a first tentative simula-
tion of the Covid-19 (Corona virus) shock which is affecting Slovenia (and virtually 
all countries in the world) at present. Section 6 concludes.
2  The macroeconometric model SLOPOL10
For this study we used an updated version of SLOPOL, a medium-sized macroe-
conometric model of the small open economy of Slovenia. In the most recent ver-
sion, SLOPOL10 consists of 75 equations, 23 of which are behavioural equations 
and 52 identities. In addition to the 75 endogenous variables, the model contains 41 
exogenous variables. A more detailed discussion of the model and its properties is 
given in Weyerstrass et al. (2018).
The behavioural equations were estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), 
except for the labour demand and supply equations, which were estimated as 
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censored Tobit models. Stationarity tests indicate that the vast majority of the vari-
ables are either stationary or cointegrated. Hence it was decided to specify the equa-
tions in error correction form, with only a few exceptions. The results of the unit 
root and cointegration tests can be found in Weyerstrass et al. (2018).
The behavioural equations were estimated using quarterly data for the period 
1995q1 to 2015q4. Data for Slovenia and for Euro Area aggregates as well as the 
oil price were taken from the Eurostat database, and world trade data came from the 
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analyses. For this paper, the data-
base has been updated to 2019q4 but the equations were not re-estimated.
The model contains behavioural equations and identities for the goods market, 
the labour market, the real effective exchange rate, the money market (albeit only 
rudimentary) and the government sector. The model combines Keynesian and neo-
classical elements. In the short run, the model is demand driven, while in the long 
run the growth path is determined from the supply side via potential output. In the 
following, the model equations are described.
The supply side incorporates neoclassical features. In accordance with the 
approach applied by the European Commission for all EU member states (Havik 
et al. 2014), potential output (full-employment or potential GDP) is determined by a 
Cobb–Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. Potential output is 
determined by trend employment (the labour force minus structural unemployment), 
capital stock and the trend of total factor productivity. In line with the literature on 
production functions as well as international practice in macroeconometric mod-
elling, the elasticities of labour and capital were set at 0.65 and 0.35 respectively. 
These elasticities correspond approximately to the shares of wages and profits, 
respectively, in national income. The NAIRU, which approximates structural unem-
ployment, is taken from the estimate provided by the European Commission. It was 
extracted in June 2019 from the website of the European Commission on which the 
results of its economic forecasts are published.
Several steps are required to determine technical progress. Firstly, ex-post total 
factor productivity (TFP) is calculated as the Solow residual, i.e. that part of the 
change in GDP that is not caused by changes in the production factors of labour 
and capital, weighted with their respective production elasticities. In a second step, 
the trend of technical progress is then determined by applying the Hodrick-Prescott 
(HP) filter. For simulations and forecasts, the trend of the TFP is explained in a 
behavioural equation. In accordance with the literature on endogenous growth, tech-
nical progress is influenced by the proportion of people with tertiary education in 
the labour force. In addition, trend TFP is influenced by the real investment ratio as 
well as lagged real government spending on research and development (R&D).
On the demand side, the consumption of private households is explained by a 
combination of a Keynesian consumption function and a function in accordance 
with the permanent income hypothesis and the life cycle hypothesis. Thus, private 
consumption depends on current disposable income and on the long-term real inter-
est rate, the latter entering the consumption equation with a negative sign. Real 
gross fixed capital formation is influenced by the change in total domestic demand 
(in accordance with the accelerator hypothesis) and by the user cost of capital, 
defined as the real interest rate plus the depreciation rate of capital stock. Changes in 
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inventories are treated as exogenous in the SLOPOL model, as in many macroeco-
nomic models in use around the world.
Real exports of goods and services are a function of the real exchange rate and 
foreign demand for Slovenian goods and services. Foreign demand is approximated 
by the volume of world trade. Real imports of goods and services depend on domes-
tic final demand and the real exchange rate.
Labour demand and labour supply are divided into the main age group (15 to 
64 years) and older people (65 years and above). The labour demand of companies, 
i.e. actual employment, is modelled via the employment rates of the two age groups, 
i.e. employment as a share of the relevant age group in the total population. Both 
equations were estimated as Tobit models, the employment rates being restricted to 
lie between 0 and 0.9 (15 to 64 years) and between 0 and 0.5 (65 years and older) 
respectively. Both employment rates are influenced positively by real GDP and neg-
atively by the real net wage and additionally by the wedge between the gross and the 
net wage. A higher tax wedge is borne partly by employers and partly by employees, 
depending on the bargaining position of the two sides of the labour market. Labour 
supply is modelled via the share of the labour force of the two age groups in the total 
population. These equations, too, were estimated as Tobit models with the restric-
tion of being positive but below 0.95 and 0.9 respectively. Labour supply depends 
positively on the real net wage and negatively on the wedge between the gross and 
the net wage.
In the wage-price system, gross wages, the consumer price index (CPI) and vari-
ous deflators are determined. The gross wage rate depends on the price level, labour 
productivity and the unemployment rate. This equation is based on a bargaining 
model of the labour market, where the relative bargaining power of the employees 
(or the trade unions) is negatively affected by unemployment. The CPI is linked to 
the private consumption deflator, the latter depending on the import deflator, unit 
labour costs and the capacity utilisation rate. The inclusion of the capacity utili-
sation rate in the price equation represents a channel for closing an output gap by 
increasing (reducing) prices in the case of over-utilisation (under-utilisation) of 
capacities. The public consumption deflator is linked to public consumption, which 
includes purchases of goods and services and the wage costs of public employees. In 
analogy to consumer prices, both the investment and export deflators are influenced 
by domestic and imported cost elements. The former are approximated by the unit 
labour costs in the investment deflator equation and the gross wage rate in the export 
deflator equation respectively while the latter are captured by the import deflator. 
Finally, the import deflator is influenced by the oil price in euros as a proxy for 
international raw material prices.
On the rudimentarily modelled money market, the short-term interest rate is 
linked to its Euro Area counterpart so as to capture Slovenia’s Euro Area mem-
bership and the resulting gradual adjustment of interest rates in Slovenia towards 
the Euro Area average. In the same vein, the long-term Euro Area interest rate is 
included in the equation determining the long-term interest rate in Slovenia. In addi-
tion, the long-term interest rate is linked to the short-term rate, representing the term 
structure of interest rates. Furthermore, the long-term interest rate is influenced by 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, representing a risk premium that rises with the debt ratio. 
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The foreign exchange market is modelled by the real effective exchange rate against 
a group of 41 countries. When determining the effective exchange rate for Slovenia, 
the fact that the country has only been a Euro Area member state since 2007 has 
to be taken into account. As the time series on which the estimations of the behav-
ioural equations are based include the period before Slovenia’s Euro Area acces-
sion in 2007, the bilateral exchange rate between the Slovenian tolar and the euro is 
included as one of the explanatory variables in the real effective exchange rate equa-
tion. In addition, the exchange rate between the euro and the US dollar is considered 
as well as inflation in Slovenia.
In the government sector block of the model, the most important expenditure and 
revenue items of the Slovenian budget are determined. Social security contributions 
by employees are calculated by multiplying the average social security contribution 
rate by the gross wage rate and the number of employees. In the same vein, income 
tax payments by employees are determined by multiplying the average income tax 
rate by the gross wage rate and the number of employees. In a behavioural equation, 
social security payments by companies are linked to social security contributions by 
employees. Profit tax payments by companies are explained by GDP as an indicator 
for the economic situation. Value added tax revenues depend on the value added 
tax rate and private consumption. Other direct and indirect taxes are determined 
via their relation to nominal GDP. Interest payments on public debt depend on the 
lagged debt level and the long-term interest rate. Public consumption, transfer pay-
ments to private households and the remaining public expenditures and revenues are 
exogenous. The public debt level is extrapolated using the budget balance equation. 
The model is rounded off by a number of identities and definition equations.
Although the SLOPOL model is used for forecasting and policy simulations, it 
should be noted that the model—like every structural econometric model—may be 
subject to the famous Lucas critique. Lucas (1976) argued that the relations between 
macroeconomic aggregates in an econometric model should differ according to the 
macroeconomic policy regime in place. In this case, the effects of a new policy 
regime cannot be predicted using an empirical model based on data from previ-
ous periods when that policy regime was not in place. As Sargent (1981) argues, 
the Lucas critique is partly based on the idea that the parameters of an observed 
decision rule should not be viewed as structural. Instead, the equations should only 
contain “deep parameters” such as preferences and technologies. These parameters 
would be invariant to changes in policy regimes. Providing for such “deep param-
eters” requires Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) or Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models. Performing simulations with similar policy 
instruments as used here with such models might be useful to obtain information 
about the sensitivity of our results with respect to the underlying theories.
An approach taking the Lucas critique into account in structural models like 
SLOPOL emerged in the so-called London School of Economics tradition initiated 
by Sargan (1964). According to this approach, economic theory guides the determi-
nation of the underlying long-run specification while the dynamic adjustment pro-
cess is derived from an analysis of the time series properties of the data series. Error 
correction models involving cointegrated variables combine the long-run equilib-
rium and the short-run adjustment mechanism.
1 3
Empirica 
A further argument for the robustness of our estimations can be seen in the fact 
that we did several updates of the model when preparing this paper and found that 
it does well when making out-of-estimation-period forecasts without changing the 
estimated equations. In addition, the calculations of the multipliers presented in 
Sect. 4 below give virtually the same results as do calculations for the years immedi-
ately after the estimation period. Hence, the model can be regarded as a reliable tool 
for forecasting the development of the Slovenian economy in the short and medium 
run.
3  A medium‑run “business as usual” projection of the Slovenian 
economy
We use the SLOPOL10 model to simulate different discretionary fiscal policies over 
the period 2020 to 2030. As no sign of a deep recession (as caused by Covid-19) 
could be seen at the beginning of 2020, we use assumptions about the future eco-
nomic environment in “normal times”, i.e. a “business as usual” scenario. Possi-
ble effects of Covid-19 will be investigated in Sect. 5. Here the impacts of the pol-
icy measures on important macroeconomic indicators like GDP growth, inflation, 
unemployment, net exports and public finances are determined by means of devia-
tions of the policy scenarios from this baseline with policies “as usual”. We mostly 
used the autumn 2019 forecast of the European Commission for Slovenia (European 
Commission 2019) to construct this baseline scenario.
The baseline simulation requires assumptions on the future developments of the 
international and domestic non-policy exogenous variables as well as on the trajec-
tories of the policy instruments. The international variables comprise world trade, 
the oil price and Euro Area interest rates. Slovenian variables that are largely beyond 
the control of the policy makers are mainly the population in the different age 
groups while Slovenian policy instruments comprise tax rates and various govern-
ment spending items.
For the interest rates, we assumed that the European Central Bank would start to 
raise its policy rates in the second half of 2020 at the earliest. Hence the three-month 
Euribor was assumed not to become positive before 2021. Afterwards it would 
continue to rise gradually to reach slightly less than 2 percent in 2030. Based on 
the term structure of interest rates, this implies that the Slovenian long-term inter-
est would only increase at a very modest pace as well. The exchange rate between 
the euro and the US dollar was held constant at 1.14 dollars per euro. During the 
first few months of 2019, world trade was very sluggish. Hence, we assumed that 
it would only grow at 3.1 percent in 2020, 3.5% in 2021 and 4% p.a. from 2022 
onwards. For the oil price (Brent), we assumed a moderate growth rate of 1 percent 
p.a. from 2020 on.
According to projections by the Slovenian Statistical Office, Slovenia’s working-
age population will decline by about 6 percent by 2030. Conversely, as is the case all 
over Europe, the population aged 65 and over will continue to rise.
Turning to the fiscal policy instruments, it was assumed that the tax and 
social security contribution rates would not be changed from their 2019 values. 
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Government consumption, public investment in equipment and machinery, public 
spending on research and development, transfer payments to private households and 
residual government expenditures and revenues were all assumed to increase by 4 
percent p.a. from 2019 until the end of the simulation period.
These settings of the exogenous variables lead to the following baseline simula-
tion results until 2030. For 2020 our model predicts real GDP growth of 2.7 percent 
and afterwards stabilising at about 2 percent per year. Due to the projected popula-
tion development and relatively low GDP growth, employment is forecast to decline 
somewhat until the end of the simulation period. The consumer price index inflation 
rate is forecast to decrease and to stabilise at 1 percent p.a. Due to favourable eco-
nomic developments, the Slovenian budget experienced a surplus in 2019. Accord-
ing to our model prediction, the surplus will prevail until 2029, with a small deficit 
in 2030. As a consequence of this development of the budget balance, the debt-to-
GDP ratio will decline from 66 percent in 2019 to around 35 percent in the last year 
of our simulation period. Our model predicted a rather pessimistic development of 
trend total factor productivity. According to the simulation, trend TFP would decline 
by 0.1 to 0.2 percent p.a. As we regarded this as too pessimistic, we exogenously 
raised trend TFP via an add factor such that it increases by around 2.3 percent per 
year on average during the simulation period.
4  Policy simulations
In this section we analyse the effectiveness of fiscal policies in Slovenia. For this 
purpose, we are interested in the deviations of important macroeconomic aggregates 
from the baseline simulation described in the previous section. We perform eight fis-
cal policy simulations. As in the baseline, the simulation period runs from 2020 to 
2030, with the policy measures implemented from 2020 onwards.
We consider four spending instruments and three tax rates. In addition, we ana-
lyse the effects of an increase in the proportion of people with tertiary education in 
the labour force. Due to a lack of adequate time series data, our model does not con-
tain a specific instrument which relates directly to the education level of the popula-
tion, such as the number of teachers at secondary schools or the amount of public 
spending on universities. We assume that the share of people with tertiary education 
can be influenced by spending measures rather than changes to tax rates. Hence, we 
count this scenario as a spending measure.
For the simulations we consider the following instruments:
 (i) GN:Government consumption, nominal.
 (ii) TRANSFERS:Transfers, nominal.
 (iii) GINVN:Public investment, nominal.
 (iv) GERD:Government expenditure on R&D, nominal.
 (v) LFTER:Proportion of people with tertiary education in the labour force.
 (vi) VAT:Value added tax rate.
 (vii) INCTAX:Personal income tax rate.
 (viii) SOCEMP:Employees’ social security contribution rate.
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For each instrument, we run one separate simulation, i.e. in each simulation only 
one instrument is altered while for all other instruments the baseline settings are 
taken.
For the first scenario we assume that from 2020 to 2030 public consumption 
(GN) is 100 million euros p.a. (25 million euros per quarter) higher than in the base-
line. In the second simulation this change is applied to transfers to private house-
holds (TRANSFERSN). In the third and fourth simulation, respectively, GINVN 
and GERD are raised by 25 million euro per quarter or 100 million euros per year 
over their baseline values. In the fifth scenario, the proportion of people with ter-
tiary education is increased by 0.5 percentage points with respect to the baseline. In 
the simulations focussing on the revenue side, the value added tax rate is reduced by 
1 percentage point from 2020 onwards while in the remaining two simulations the 
income tax rate and the employees’ social security contribution rate, respectively, 
are reduced by 0.5 percentage points relative to the baseline.
By definition, public consumption and transfers initially trigger pure demand 
effects, either directly or via private consumption. Public investment does not only 
have the demand effect by being part of the GDP expenditure identity (as public 
consumption) but in addition it raises potential output via the capital stock. Further-
more, the investment ratio influences TFP; thus public investment has two impacts 
on potential GDP. Public R&D spending also influences total factor productivity and 
is also part of investment; hence this spending category initiates both demand and 
supply effects as well. The difference between the impacts of GINV and GERD is 
that the former affects the TFP only indirectly via the investment ratio while the lat-
ter also has a direct effect on total factor productivity.
Ceteris paribus, a higher VAT rate reduces disposable income and hence nega-
tively influences private consumption. Changes in the income tax rate influence the 
tax wedge, i.e. the difference between gross and net wages. A higher tax wedge has 
negative effects on both labour demand and labour supply, which is another supply-
side policy effect. Increases in the income tax rate, in addition, reduce disposable 
income. Finally, the social security contribution rate influences the tax wedge and 
disposable income in the same way as the income tax rate. In addition, changes in 
employees’ social security contributions also influence employers’ contributions as 
employers’ and employees’ social security contributions are linked via a behavioural 
equation.
The following figures show the resulting absolute deviations from the baseline of 
important macroeconomic aggregates which are generally regarded as policy targets 
(real GDP level and growth, potential GDP, CPI level, employment, unemployment 
rate, debt-to-GDP ratio) in the various policy simulations. In order to keep the fig-
ures legible, the scenarios targeting the expenditure and revenue sides of the budget 
are shown in separate figures. The names of the scenarios as indicated in the legends 
correspond to the policy instruments as mentioned above.
As we assumed the change in each of the policy instruments (increases in spend-
ing, decreases in taxes) to be approximately equal in size in terms of 2020 euros, 
we can compare the effectiveness of each of them over time. Figure 1 shows that 
three instruments from the expenditure side lead to permanently higher real GDP: 
government spending on R&D (GERD), measures to improve human capital 
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(LEFTER), and government investment (GINV). Conversely, government consump-
tion (GN), transfers (TRANSFERS) and the three tax measures initiate smaller and, 
more importantly, only relatively short-lived increases in output, with crowding-
out effects for public consumption after three years, transfer payments after seven 
years, income taxes (INCTAX) and social security contributions (SOCEMP) after 
six years. The instruments with long-run effects are those that address the supply 
side and increase total factor productivity and, hence, potential output, in addition 
to aggregate demand. This is also visible in Fig. 3. These effects are strongest for 
expenditure relating to R&D and tertiary education, in agreement with growth the-
ory, which predicts permanent growth effects primarily from technical progress, to 
which these two instruments are strongly related. Public investment increases the 
Fig. 1  Real GDP. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
Fig. 2  Real GDP growth. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
Fig. 3  Potential GDP. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
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capital stock, and therefore also potential output, but these increases fall over time 
due to the diminishing marginal productivity of capital. None of the fiscal policy 
instruments under consideration exerts a permanent effect on the growth rate of real 
GDP (Fig. 2), as expected from neoclassical growth theory.
Figure 4 shows that the effects on prices are very small, particularly for the tax 
measures and increases in transfers. The other instruments, although applied in an 
expansionary way, lead to a slightly lower price level and (temporarily) lower infla-
tion. This, at first glance, somewhat unexpected result can be explained by the rela-
tive size of the supply-side versus demand-side effects: potential output increases 
more than actual GDP, which implies that the supply-side effect dominates the 
demand-side effect. For the investment variables (GINV, GERD and LEFTER), this 
effect is more pronounced due to their impact on the capital stock. However, it also 
holds for the instruments affecting public or private consumption since the elastic-
ity of imports with respect to GDP is well above one according to the estimated 
import equation, which dampens the GDP effect (but not the potential output effect) 
of expansionary fiscal policies.
While the tax policy measures considered here have only small effects on the 
goods market, they impact the labour market more strongly. As Figs. 5 and 6 show, 
the labour market is affected by the tax measures in particular. On the expenditure 
side, transfers have only very minor and transitory effects on employment while 
public consumption effects even turn negative after three years. Again, supply-side 
measures exert stronger, longer lasting effects which increase over time, especially 
those measures enhancing R&D and tertiary education. Nevertheless, all of these 
Fig. 4  CPI level. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
Fig. 5  Employment. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
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effects are relatively small in terms of additional employment and reduced unem-
ployment as compared to direct tax reductions. These instruments generate more 
than six times as many additional jobs as even the most effective expenditure meas-
ure, although this effect decreases after four years. From this it can be concluded that 
policy makers will have to reduce the tax wedge of income tax and social security 
contributions (payroll related costs) in order to increase employment and decrease 
unemployment. The small transitory increase in the unemployment rate in the first 
year (Fig. 6) is due to the fact that labour supply reacts more quickly to the reduction 
in tax rates than labour demand.
Finally, Fig. 7 shows the effects on public debt in relation to nominal GDP. Recall 
that the immediate effect of each measure on the public budget and, hence, the first 
round effect (in 2020) on the budget balance is assumed to be approximately the 
same for each measure. Over time, however, the costs develop differently in terms of 
a higher debt-to-GDP ratio. When it comes to the sustainability of public finances, 
the clear winner is expenditure related to R&D, with human capital stimulation 
coming second. The loser is the reduction in VAT. Given its low effectiveness with 
respect to output and especially employment, this instrument seems to be rather 
unattractive. Instead, if containing public debt within the limits prescribed by the 
EU Stability and Growth Pact is required, an increase in the VAT rate to finance 
income tax reductions and additional supply-side related expenditure may be a rea-
sonable policy mix.
Fig. 6  Unemployment rate. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
Fig. 7  Debt-to-GDP ratio. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
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5  Covid‑19 effects
Given the fact that the Covid-19 pandemic is affecting Slovenia like nearly all coun-
tries in the world, the reader may question the analysis presented in Sects. 3 and 4 
by asking why determine policy multipliers for a scenario which did not occur and 
will not occur in the near future. The reason is twofold: First, we consider the policy 
effects in “normal times”, which may include recessions such as the Great Recession 
but not a catastrophic event such as Covid-19. Second, at the time of finishing this 
study (beginning of December 2020), we are in the midst of the Covid-19 crisis: 
only very tentative results can be obtained as the length and degree of the crisis and 
its economic impacts cannot be even approximately assessed. Moreover, it is not yet 
clear what fiscal policies in Slovenia and—even more uncertain—in the Euro Area 
will look like and how they will impact on a national economy like the Slovenian. 
Nevertheless, we attempt to sketch a possible scenario of possible macroeconomic 
effects of the pandemic. To do so, we start from the baseline solution of the model 
and consider some exogenous shocks which we believe are to be expected or are 
already in force in Slovenia.
In Slovenia, the first victim of the virus (the first person to be tested positively) 
was identified on March 4, 2020, with increases in the cumulative number of 
infected persons to low 4-digit numbers one month later, where they stayed with 
only small increases until the start of October. The first case of death from Covid-19 
occurred on March 14. Then, after the end of the summer vacations and associated 
travel activities, the number of daily infections increased to 4-digit numbers, result-
ing in a cumulative number of infections of over 80,000 at the beginning of Decem-
ber 2020. Thus, like in many other European countries, a first wave occurring in 
spring was followed by a second, and much stronger, wave in fall.
The Slovenian government reacted to this development as follows: on March 
13, the epidemic was declared and the Slovenian Parliament adopted several emer-
gency laws (approved by the European Commission, where required), supported by 
measures involving the Slovenian Export and Development Bank and the Slovene 
Enterprise Fund. Starting on March 16, all educational institutions were closed, all 
public transport and all “unnecessary” services in the country were suspended, and 
all hotels, restaurants, and bars were closed. On March 20 de facto quarantine (with 
some exceptions) was established (Damijan 2020). Financial support to enterprises 
included direct corporate financing in the form of long-term loans with favourable 
interest rates, direct and indirect funding of small and medium enterprises to cover 
their costs during the epidemic, the financing of investments and working capital for 
the sustainable growth of tourism, funds for health care institutions and establish-
ments, microloans for companies in areas with high unemployment and in border 
areas, and guarantees for bank loans with an interest rate subsidy.
The reaction of the Slovenian government to the first wave in March proved to be 
successful, as the numbers of new infections could be kept low, not only during the 
lockdown but also over the entire summer. In fact, during this period, Slovenia was 
among the best European countries in terms of infections per 100,000 inhabitants. 
At that time, economic forecasts (Damijan 2020; Bank of Slovenia 2020, and IMAD 
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2020) were rather optimistic, with a projected decline in real GDP by 6–7 percent in 
2020 and a recovery of about the same size in the following year.
Unfortunately, the situation changed dramatically with the advent of the second 
wave of the pandemic. Although nearly all European countries were affected by that 
wave, Slovenia was hit particularly hard, with the numbers of deaths per 100,000 
inhabitants being among the 10 highest worldwide in December. The Slovenian gov-
ernment reacted in a similar way to the first wave: on October 18, a state of emer-
gency was declared for 30 days (which was subsequently tightened and prolonged 
until mid-January 2021), involving a nationwide curfew from 9 pm to 6 am (with 
few exceptions), severe restrictions on travel, the suspension of public transport, 
distance learning in all educational institutions, an obligation to wear masks eve-
rywhere outside the home, and a ban on gatherings and events; most non-essential 
businesses were closed. Nevertheless, the numbers of newly infected persons per 
day in Slovenia were still in the 4-digit range at the beginning of December 2020.
Although the epidemic is still expanding in Slovenia and no current economic 
forecast has taken this into account, we dare provide a first estimate of the macro-
economic effects of this process. The last available forecast for world trade volume 
is from October 6 from the WTO, estimating –9.2% for 2020 and + 7.2% for 2021, 
with the latter probably being too optimistic, even if vaccination has a positive effect 
on the situation in 2021. The same is true for the autumn forecast (IMAD 2020a and 
2020b), predicting GDP growth in Slovenia of –6.7 for 2020 and + 5.1 for 2021.
We decided to interpret the Covid-19 shock as a combination of demand and sup-
ply shocks. The extent of the negative exogenous shocks on real private consump-
tion, private investment, and exports as well as on potential output was calibrated (in 
the quarterly version of the model) so as to match the realized values of these vari-
ables for the first wave (2020q2) as closely as possible; for the second wave (2020q4 
and 2021), we assumed slightly stronger impacts which would diminish gradually in 
2021. This implies a more pessimistic estimate of the Slovenian economy over the 
first few months of 2021, even if vaccination is possible in 2021. For the following 
years, growth from the lower level of 2021 with similar rates as in the baseline solu-
tion was assumed. The figures for the key macro variables illustrated in Figs. 8, 9, 
10, 11 show the results of this simulation denoted by “Corona”. A second simulation 
Real GDP level GDP growth rate
Fig. 8  Real GDP (level and growth rate). Source authors’ calculations and illustration
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takes government policy measures into account as announced so far; we assume that 
government expenditures to continue in 2021 to mitigate decreases in output and 
employment. This simulation is labelled “Corona + policy”. As expected, simulated 
real GDP falls in 2020 and remains below the baseline until the end of the simula-
tion period, with similar effects on potential GDP. The effects on private consump-
tion and investment are qualitatively similar, and it takes until the middle of the next 
Real gross fixed capital formation Real private consumption
Fig. 9  Consumption and investment. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
Employment Unemployment rate
Fig. 10  Labour market. Source authors’ calculations and illustration
Potential GDP Debt-to-GDP ratio 
Fig. 11  Potential output and debt-to-GDP ratio
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decade to regain pre-crisis levels. Although GDP growth resumes baseline values 
by then, the levels of GDP and its components remain below baseline until the end 
of the simulation period; hence the pandemic implies a permanent output loss. For 
employment and unemployment, on the other hand, convergence toward the baseline 
occurs in the late 2020s. The main difference achieved by the fiscal policy meas-
ures is a delay in the decline in investment and employment and a smoother path 
for GDP, at the expense of a permanent (in the absence of consolidation measures) 
increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio by about 20 percentage points.
Of course, it must be stressed that these scenarios have been constructed under a 
very high degree of uncertainty both with respect to future epidemiological develop-
ments and international and national policy reactions, especially in the EU and the 
Euro Area in particular. If we consider the results of the calculation of the multipli-
ers, in any case it would be advisable for the Slovenian government to supplement 
its fiscal policy measures with some measures increasing expenditures on research 
and development and on education, as these have the strongest effects on aggregate 
demand and supply.
6  Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the effectiveness of fiscal policy measures to increase 
output and reduce unemployment in the case of a fall in aggregate demand. Despite 
Slovenia’s very favourable economic development in the past two years, this ques-
tion boils down to which fiscal policy measures would be adequate should an event 
similar to the Great Recession occur again. We used the SLOPOL10 econometric 
model of the Slovenian economy to simulate the effects of different expansionary 
fiscal policy measures on the revenue and expenditure sides.
Our results show that public spending measures which entail both demand- and 
supply-side effects, i.e. public investment and especially spending on R&D and ter-
tiary education, are more effective at stimulating real GDP than pure demand-side 
measures. Measures that improve the education level of the labour force are very 
effective at stimulating potential GDP. Employment can be most effectively stimu-
lated by cutting the income tax rate and the social security contribution rate. Higher 
spending on research and development only has negligible effects on the debt-to-
GDP ratio while all the other fiscal policy measures that we considered lead to 
higher public debt. Due to the high elasticity of imports with respect to demand, 
pure demand-side effects on real variables are small, showing that a small open 
economy like Slovenia only has very little scope for influencing macroeconomic 
developments with pure demand management policies. We also provide tentative 
simulations (without and with active fiscal policy) for the current Covid-19 pan-
demic and its economic effects.
Of course, it would be premature to suggest strong and precise recommendations 
for the policy makers in Slovenia based on just one model specification. It should 
be noted, however, that in a recent study with a New Keynesian DSGE model, Sims 
and Wolff (2018) show that countercyclical fiscal policies are more successful when 
using productive public investment instead of public consumption. Our results also 
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clearly support the theory and empirical evidence that supply-side policies strength-
ening potential GDP bring about the best results in terms of stimulating economic 
growth and employment without putting too much additional strain on public 
finances. Moreover, the labour market can best be influenced positively by reducing 
the tax wedge.
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